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Abstract There is an intense debate on the impact of labour regulation in India
today. Labour regulation in India differ state-wise and apply differently across types
of workers (both regular and contract workers). This paper examines the joint
effects of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and variable enforcement
intensity on the growth in a size of temporary contract workers in the organised
manufacturing sector. It uses the state level amendments to Industrial Dispute Act of
1947, and the average size of total number of labour inspectors for each state, as
independent variables to capture the variation in labour regulations and enforcement
intensity across thirty-one Indian states for the period 2000–2007. This paper argues
that, average Indian firms located in strict EPL states hire differentially more
temporary contract workers as compare to regular workers in response to variable
enforcement intensity. Among other findings, the empirical analysis shows that
firms prefer to employ excessive number of contract workers to circumvent firing
and overall compliance costs of regular workers as stipulated by the Indian labour
laws. Our results are robust to alternative specifications.
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1 Introduction
The effect of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) on the growth in a size of
temporary contract workers in developing countries is widely debated in the recent
economic literature. Since the past two decades, the share of temporary contract
workers as compared to regular workers has increased rapidly (ILO 2012). A
segment of temporary contract workers mainly consists of those who are recruited
by firms through third party contractors or temporary work agencies, and who lack
the security of a definite tenure as well as basic employment protection. Temporary
contract workers not only constitute a significant share of the labour market in
developing countries, but their share has also seen a substantial rise in many
developed countries.1 At a micro level, this growth has closely been associated with
an attempt to increase labour market flexibility-an employment adjustment
technique for flexible management of labour (OECD 2014). In the absence of this
flexibility, labour markets in many developing economies would likely to
experience high levels of unemployment. Firms in developing countries tend to
depend excessively on temporary contract workers as it enables them to adapt to
fluctuations in the business cycles. Thus, this growth has generally been perceived
as a positive development in the labour market. On the other hand, this positive
development has its own drawback. A growth in their share is coupled with poor
working condition, low productivity and lack of social cohesion with regular
workers (World Bank 2012). This suggests that the demand for temporary contract
workers to adjust firms’ workforce is actually making them more vulnerable
workforce, if they are not covered under any employment protection laws. And
therefore, it is likely that supply and demand factors could have influenced the
growth of temporary contract workers.
Earlier studies argues that the growth in a size of temporary contract workers is
triggered by the stringent EPL, in particular strict dismissal laws, that increase the
adjustment costs of regular workers and discourages firms from adjusting their
workforce in the presence of adverse economic conditions (Boeri and Jimeno 2005;
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002; Booth et al. 2002). According to these studies, a
higher magnitude of firing costs of regular workers also increases the compliance
costs of overall labour regulation and offers less flexibility to firms in balancing
workforce in response to the product market competition. As a result, when faced
with strict EPL, firms are likely to avoid the burden of adjustment costs and overall
compliance costs labour regulations through employing temporary contract workers.
This large body of literature has two main features. First, it mostly focuses on the
developed countries where labour regulations are perfectly enforced (Botero et al.
2004; Schneider and Enste 2000). Second, most of these studies have overlooked
the role of the imperfect nature of enforcement in analyzing the effects of EPL
1 The share of temporary and short term contractual workers is increasing in many OECD countries over
the past few decades. According to OECD Employment Outlook report (2010), it has increased four times
in the Scandinavian countries and has almost doubled in other European countries. This segment,
however, employed 6.8 % point of the European Union working population in 2006. In the United States
and the Japanese labour markets the same segment covers 6.2 and 4.9 % point of the total workforce
respectively (Heinrich et al. 2008).
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(Almeida and Poole 2013; Deakin et al. 2007). Much of the empirical literature has
been extended to analyse both-the impact of strict EPL on the firm’s demand for
temporary contract workers, where perfect compliance with labour regulation was
implicitly assumed, (Pierre and Scarpetta 2013; Cuesta and Martin 2009; Autor
2003), and the impact of enforcement intensity on compliance with labour
regulation that constrains the demand for temporary contract workers (Almeida and
Carneiro 2012; Ronconi 2010; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005). However, none of
these studies have looked at a case of labour markets in developing countries where
there is a weak compliance with labour laws, and the de facto level of regulation is
lower than the de jure level (Feldmann 2009; Djankov and Ramalho 2009).
Given this context, this paper aims to estimate the joint effects of EPL and
variable enforcement intensity on the growth in a size of temporary contract workers
in the organised (formal) Indian labour market. In particular, it examines-whether
firms located in a stricter EPL regime hire differentially more temporary contract
workers in response to variable enforcement intensity. India provides an ideal
setting to study the growth in a size of temporary contract workers in the organised
Indian labour market. India has highly restrictive employment protection laws but
its enforcement is very poor. In India, the share of temporary contract workers has
increased from 10 % points to 27 % point; the share of regular workers has
decreased from 68 % point to 54 % point for the period 1995–2010 respectively
(Fig. 1). The Industrial Dispute Act of 1947 (hereafter IDA, 1947) sets out the
regulations governing employer-worker relations and covers various aspects such as
the resolution of labour disputes, hiring and firing workers, closure of establish-
ments, retrenchment, strikes and lockouts. This act covers regular workers who are
directly employed in the formal sector, through long-term contracts, and are largely
represented by the trade unions. However, temporary contract workers are exempted
from the application of severance payment, mandatory notice or retrenchment
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Fig. 1 Ratio of regular and temporary contract workers. Source: Annual Survey of Industries, various
years
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from the legal compliance incentivise employers to hire an increasing number of
contract workers due the flexibility it offers in the formal labour market (see Fig. 2).
The theoretical premise for an empirical analysis is derived from a simple model
of dynamic labour demand developed by Adhvaryu et al. (2013) and Bertola (1990).
According to their theoretical model, firing and compliance costs, as mandated by
the strict EPL, factor into forward-looking employment decisions of the firm. If
strict EPL, that protects the rights of regular workers and enforcement of those legal
rights, are perfectly complied then it is possible for firms to circumvent those laws.
They would do so by reducing the demand for regular workers and increasing the
demand for temporary contract workers since the latter category of workers are
exempted from legal compliance. In this context, we expect that firms located in
strict EPL states, and faced with high enforcement intensity, are likely to experience
higher incidence of temporary contract workers as compared to those firms located
in less strict EPL states, facing low enforcement intensity.
For an empirical analysis, this paper uses the dataset of Annual Survey of
Industries to compute the share of temporary contract workers. Next, it exploits
variation in EPL and enforcement intensity measures, across thirty-one Indian
states, for the period 2000–2007. The results suggest that the average effect of strict
EPL and high enforcement intensity on the growth in size of temporary contract
workers is positive and statistically significant across Indian states. The average
effect is stronger for enforcement intensity than EPL. This implies that strongly
enforced legal rights for regular workers increases the demand for temporary
contract workers relative to strict EPL. Second, compared to firms in more flexible
labour regimes, those in an increasingly restrictive labour regime hire differentially
a higher number of temporary contract workers as response to variable enforcement
intensities. And finally, the study report that the demand for temporary contract
workers is rising in almost all labour intensive industries but the magnitude of the
growth is slightly higher in inflexible states as compared to flexible states.
The topic discussed here is important for two reasons: first, it adds to the growing
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Fig. 2 Share of temporary contract workers across different labour regimes. Source: Annual Survey of
Industries, various years
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labour regulation as stipulated in the national legislation and their variable
enforcements generate incentives to use temporary contract workers. Second, in the
context of India, labour regulation is criticised for being restrictive since its strict
enforcement may create obstacles to economic activity. Due to variation in EPL and
enforcement intensity across Indian states, some firms may be more affected than
others; thus, the present study provides a better understanding of this complex
interplay of institutions which is crucial for allocative efficiency in the labour
market.
The paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 provides a snapshot of previous
studies; Sect. 3 provides an overview of labour regulation and enforcement climate;
Sect. 4 describes the dataset and variables; Sect. 5 looks at identification strategy
and summary statistics; Sect. 6 reports empirical results and robustness checks.
Finally, Sect. 7 provides the conclusion.
2 Previous studies
The evolution and persistence of temporary contract workers and its effects on the
formal labour markets has already been a subject of immense policy debate in
countries with different regulatory frameworks and labour market conditions. In the
introduction section, we provide an overview of few studies that have used different
labour regulatory framework to study the factors responsible for the rise in the share
of temporary contract workers. This regulatory framework was implicitly assumed
that the labour regulation is perfectly complied. However, it is true in the context of
developed countries but may not be true for the developing country like India. In
this section, we provide an overview some landmark studies that have analysed the
impact of different regulatory frameworks and labour market conditions on the rise
of share of temporary contract workers. The US (United State of America) labour
market is widely recognised as one of the most flexible labour market in the World.
According to Autor (2003), the rise in a number of temporary contract workers in
the US is causally related to the adoption of one class of exception by the US courts
(i.e. an exception clause to legal doctrine of employment-at-will)—the implied
contract right to ongoing employment by forty-six member states. On contrary,
Kalleberg (2011) considers macro factors such as declining labour market
regulation and oversight; diminished union power and global capital are in part
responsible for the growth of temporary workers in the US economy. In the British
labour market, the same growth is attributed to the European Commission (EC)
directive that is being promulgated to prevent discrimination against temporary
workers and extension of employment protection to protect legal rights of temporary
contract workers (Forde and Slater 2005). In the context of Germany, Antoni and
Jahn (2009) examines the impact of the amendment reforming the Labour
Placement Act of Germany, in the period of liberalisation, has significantly
increased the average employment duration of temporary workers. In response to
persistence high unemployment faced since the early 1980s, many European
countries have adopted widely varying labour policies concerning employment
protection. Among them, the national policy instrument were leveraged in the
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direction of introducing the possibility of hiring temporary workers on flexible,
fixed-duration contracts, aimed at encouraging job creation (see Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay 2002; Booth et al. 2002).
In the Indian case, to begin with, the most influential study by Besley and
Burgess (2004) examines the economic effects of two Central government level
amendments (1976 and 1984 amendments) to the chapter VB of IDA, 1947 on the
employment outcome. The labour regulation index constructed by Besley and
Burgess (2004) (henceforth the BB index) has further been used by Aghion et al.
(2008) to assess the effect of the entry regulation (The Licence Raj); by Hasan et al.
(2007) to analyse the effect of trade reforms on labour demand elasticity; by
Adhvaryu et al. (2013) to examine the sensitivity of industrial employment to local
demand shocks; and finally by Sanyal and Menon (2005) to analyse the impact of
labour regulation on firms’ decision on the plant location and investment.
Dougherty (2009) using the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) index on the labour regulation argues that states with flexible
labour laws, and plants in labour-intensive industries, experienced a fourteen
percent improvement in total factor productivity compared to their counterparts.
Using the same index, Golder and Aggarwal (2012) examined the determinants of
informalisation of organised workforce by focusing on import competition and
labour market rigidities. They report that in the post-liberalisation, import
competition was responsible for creating an increasing number of casual jobs,
temporary contract jobs compared to regular jobs, for workers with above primary-
level education. Ahsan and Page´s (2009) departs from the earlier analyses of labour
regulation indices, which captures specific provisions on hiring and firing
restrictions. In the paper they assess the effects of two cost components that could
lead to labour market rigidities: first, the hiring and firing costs incurred by the
employer while responding to global competition; second, the cost of resolving
labour disputes that otherwise could have an effect on the firm size. The study
suggests that states with inflexible labour laws and costly dispute resolution
mechanisms experienced lower levels of output and employment growth, than states
with flexible labour laws and less costly dispute resolution mechanisms. Fagerna¨s
(2010) provides a new direction to the present debate. Her paper analyses the effect
of labour dispute legislation, and dispute settlement process (as a proxy index for
the enforcement mechanism), on the formal–informal employment divide in India.
The study concludes that the relationship between judicial efficiency (as captured by
constructing an indicator of Court efficiency), and formal employment is weak.
Recently, Soundararajan (2013) examines the impact of minimum wage legislation
and enforcement intensities in the Central government sphere (a similar measure we
have used in this study) on wages and employment among low wage construction
workers in India.
Our extensive survey of literature, on the Indian labour market, confirms that the
labour regulation climate indeed has a significant negative impact on the economic
growth and the employment level. One aspect which has been overlooked in these
studies (except two -Fagerna¨s (2010) and Soundararajan (2013)), but has relevant
policy implications, is the variations in labour regulation and enforcement intensity
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and their joint effects on the growth in a size of temporary contract workers in the
Indian manufacturing sector.
3 Labour regulation and enforcement climate
3.1 Labour regulation
Under Article 246 of the Constitution of India, labour is a subject in the Concurrent
List. India is a federal democracy wherein the Central (union) and State
governments are competent to enact legislations. Due to joint jurisdictions, a large
number of labour laws have been enacted to cater to different aspects of labour
regulation. The central and state governments have powers to formulate rules to
facilitate implementation of these laws. The industrial relation system is mainly
governed by the Trade Union Act, 1926,2 the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, the
Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 19463 and finally, the Contract
Labour Act, 1970.4 These laws are mostly applicable to firms in the formal sector,
and the execution of labour laws varies greatly across Indian states.
Among several legislations, the IDA deserves special attention in this paper. The
main objective of the Act is to govern industrial dispute resolution procedures, and
provide employment protection in case of unjust retrenchment, layoffs and lockouts.
The IDA applies to a variety of establishments and industries in India. The terms
‘industrial establishment’ or ‘industries’ are used in the widest possible sense. It
brings together almost all economic activities within the ambit of the Act, and is
most widely applied in Indian organised sector. It also establishes a three-tiered
dispute resolution mechanism comprising conciliation, arbitration, and compulsory
adjudication of labour disputes.
In the IDA, the regular workers’ layoffs and retrenchments are covered under
Sections V-A and V-B respectively. Section V-A lays down regulations for
establishments with 50 or more workers. For example, a retrenched worker is
2 The Trade Union Act of 1926 deals with the formation, and registration of trade unions by employers
for the purpose of collective bargaining. Under this Act, trade union organizations are legally sanctioned
and collective bargaining (at least nominally), strikes, and lockouts are regulated.
3 The Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 provides rules and regulations governing the
general terms and conditions of employment between the employee and the employer. Under this Act, the
employer and the employee must agree on a set of rules and regulations governing the contractual
employer/employee relationship. This Act provides income and job security to workers and safeguards
the interest of both parties in case of a breach of the employment contract.
4 The Contract Labour Act, 1970 was brought into effect to regulate the employment of contract
labourers in certain establishments, and to provide for its abolition in certain circumstances. A contract
labourer is defined in the Act as ‘‘one who is hired in connection with the work of an establishment by a
principal employer (the firm) or through a contractor’’. The Act makes certain provisions for the welfare
of contract workers as a whole including payment of minimum wages, certain health and sanitation
facilities on the work premises, provident fund benefits and so on. However, it has been observed in many
field studies that this Act is completely overlooked by principal firms and contractors, and the legal rights
of contract workers are poorly enforced. Due to the lack of collective bargaining and legal protection
from labour laws, contract workers continue to face vulnerable work conditions and poor welfare (Shyam
Sunder 2011).
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entitled to compensation equal to 15 days’ average pay for each year of service and
for layoffs; every worker is paid fifty percent of basic wages and a dearness
allowance for each day that they are laid off (maximum of 45 days). Regulations in
Section V-B cover all establishments with 100 or more workers. This section is
more stringent and requires firms to take government permission to layoff or
retrench a single worker. Closing down of establishments requires 60 days
(Section V-A) or ninety days (Section V-B) of prior notification to the government.
Thus, both these sections of the IDA increase the costs of firing and compliance
with the labour regulations. According to the IDA, contract workers are exempted
from the application of severance payment, mandatory notice, or retrenchment
authorisation. This creates an incentive for the employer to hire temporary contract
workers differentially relative to the regular workers. Firms are free to hire and fire
contract workers as market conditions change, without being subjected to the
provisions of the IDA. (Rajeev 2010; Deshpande et al. 2004) observed that in many
Indian states, a large number of temporary contract workers are being employed in
work of a perennial nature, and is mostly being done by regular workers. Moreover,
they are being paid almost 45 % point less wages than the regular workers
(Bhandari and Heshmati 2008). Therefore, excessive reliance on temporary contract
workers has become a prominent feature of the Indian organised sector.
3.2 Enforcement mechanism
India’s employment protection legislation dovetails job, income security, and
collective bargaining to regular workers in the organised sector. However, their
effectiveness relies on how well these legislations are enforced. The present
industrial relations system allows each state to amend and execute all labour
regulations prescribed by the central government. There are forty-five central
government labour regulations (on which states can make further amendments), and
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Fig. 3 Average number of labour inspectors (state sphere). Source: Pocket Book of Labour Statistics,
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labour legislations, especially across states, and makes enforcement increasingly
burdensome. Enforcement of labour regulations is decentralised at the level of
states. At the state level, the enforcement capacity is low due to poor human
resource capability and lack of financial resources in the state labour departments.
Industrial relation system is designed in a way that every Labour Inspector,
Commissioner and Zone-officer, working under state jurisdiction, is responsible for
enforcing multiple laws. Consequently, there is a gap between the number of labour
inspectors available for inspection and their demand in enforcing these myriad acts.
Since the 1990s, there has been an overall decline in the total number of labour
inspectors as well as factory inspections at the state level. In this paper, the
enforcement intensity measured in terms of human capacity is the number of labour
inspectors per one thousand workers. The mean number of labour inspectors is 0.23
for one thousand workers across states. In the year 2000, the average number of
labour inspectors was 0.25. This further declined to 0.19 in 2007 (Figs. 3, 4). In the
central sphere for minimum wage legislation, the mean number of labour inspectors
declined from 6.51 in 2000 to 4.17 in 2010 for ten thousand workers in the
scheduled industries (Soundararajan 2013). This decline is partially associated with
a paucity of government spending on the labour department personnel (Shyam
Sunder 2007), and partly due to the growing incidence of collusive agreements (e.g.
a bribe) between employers and inspectors, the latter turning a blind eye to the non-
compliance of laws (Basu et al. 2010; Rajeev 2010). Other institutional changes
were adopted (adoption of ‘New Industrial Policy’) to curtail the power of the
labour inspection system to attract foreign direct investments and promote a
business friendly environment. This change, however, exempts certain types of
firms from inspections (such as firms located in special economic zones (SEZ’s),
small and medium size industries, and firms registered under the shops and
establishment acts) and is also allowed to self-certify compliance. As a result,
heterogeneity in enforcement intensity at state levels is primarily driven by the
state’s economic policy, changes in institutional configurations, and their pursuit for
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Fig. 4 Incidence of contract workers by enforcement intensities. Source: Author’s own calculation
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4 Data description
This paper combines different data-sources: (1) Data on contract workers, value
added and industry characteristics, (2) Data on labour regulation, (3) Data on
Enforcement intensity, and (4) Data on state level indicators. The primary data
source for this study is obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI) of
the Government of India. It is a state-industry level aggregate cross-sectional dataset
on total output, value added, profit, employment (both regular and contract
workers), capital stock, wages and so on, at the three-digit National Industrial
Classification (NIC) industry level, and at the state level for the period 2000–2007.
The ASI extends to the entire country. It covers all factories registered under
Sections. 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948, i.e. those factories that
employ ten or more workers and use power; and those that employ twenty or more
workers, without using power respectively. Our state-industry panel dataset contains
data on twenty-five states and six union territories (UT’s) for almost sixty-four three
digit industries.
Data on the labour regulation index is drawn from the study by Besley and
Burgess (2004). It is based on state-level amendments to the IDA for the period
1958–1992. This index captures the inter-state variation in labour regulation over
time. The index on labour regulation takes values as follows: if there is no
amendment, it scores ‘0’; if the amendment is pro-worker, it takes the value of ‘1’;
and finally, if the amendment is pro-employer then the score is ‘-1’. A pro-worker
(pro-employer) amendment was one that decreased (increased) a firm’s flexibility in
hiring and firing of workers while a neutral amendment left it unchanged. The BB
index codes a direction of change if there are multiple amendments in a given year
for each state. The cumulated sum of these scores in all previous years would
determine the state’s labour regime in a particular year. The BB index on the
composite labour regulation ends in 1992. This paper reviewed the IDA, 1947 in a
recent edition of Malik (2009) and collected almost nine state amendments that
were enacted after 1992—these are included in the appendix section of this paper.
The BB index and its coding procedure was heavily criticised by (Bhattacharjea
2006). However, in later two studies, these criticisms have been used to correct the
index (Ahsan and Page´s 2009; Gupta et al. 2009). Following Besley and Burgess
(2004), and Gupta et al. (2009), this paper follows the method of cumulating the BB
scores to categorise the states in three categories: pro-worker, pro-employer and
neutral for each year. Based upon a revised measure, six states are classified as pro-
employer (flexible states) viz. Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan,
Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. Another fourteen states are classified as pro-worker states
(inflexible states): Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Delhi (UT), Goa, Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Kerala and
West Bengal. The remaining eleven states are classified as neutral states:
Chandigarh (UT), Dadara Nagar Haveli (UT), Jammu & Kashmir, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Nagaland, Pondicherry (UT), Tripura, Daman and Diu (UT), Uttaran-
chal, and Andaman and Nicobar (UT) (see Appendix of Table 8).
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In this paper, the enforcement intensity is measured in terms of human capacity:
number of labour inspectors per one thousand workers. The data on the enforcement
intensity corresponding to Annual Survey of Industry years are obtained from the
appendix sections of Pocket book of Labour Statistics published by the Labour
Bureau, Ministry of Labour and Employment of Government of India. To analyse
the responsiveness of strict EPL, with variable enforcement intensity, we have
categorised the enforcement intensity measure in two sub-indexes: high enforce-
ment intensity, and low enforcement intensity at a state level (see Appendix-I). If
the mean number of labour inspectors for a given state is higher than the overall
mean value (0.23) of labour inspectors in our sample, then that state is referred to as
having high enforcement intensity. For instance, the state of West Bengal has on an
average 0.45 labour inspectors for one thousand workers making it a case of a state
with a high enforcement intensity. In a similar vein, if mean number of labour
inspectors is lower than overall sample mean of labour inspectors, then that
particular state has been classified as low enforcement intensity. For instance, the
state of Karnataka has on an average 0.19 labour inspectors, much less than the
sample mean on enforcement intensity.
Finally, the data on control variables comes from the statistical abstracts of
Indian states, various reports on Economic Survey, and the Annual Survey of
Industries. We use the following control variables at the state level: per capita state
domestic product, per capita road lengths, per capita electricity consumptions, and
per capita state development expenditure.
5 Identification strategy and summary statistics
In this section, the study discuss the empirical methodology that examines whether
firms located in stricter EPL states hire differentially more temporary contract
workers in response to variable enforcement intensity. The identification strategy is
closely related to Adhvaryu et al. (2013) who use state-industry and district level
data to find that total employment in states/districts with more flexible labour
regimes are more responsive to demand shocks. Exploiting variation in EPL and
enforcement intensity, we first measure the impact of EPL and enforcement
intensity on our dependent variable: the log ratio of contract workers to total
workers at the state-industry level for the period 2000–2007.
At the aggregate level, the base regression specification is thus:
Yi;s;t ¼ ai þ as þ at þ b1 EPLs;t
 þ b2ðENFORCEs;tÞ þ b3 EPLs;t  ENFORCEs;t
 
þ ds;t þ es;t
ð1Þ
(Yi,s,t) represents the log ratio of contract workers to total workers for industry (i),
state(s) at time (t). The base regression Eq. (1) controls for macro shocks with
industry fixed effects (ai), state fixed effects (as) and for time-invariant state-in-
dustry variation with year fixed effects (at). Industry specific fixed effects take into
account the macro shocks resulting from the product market competition. The state-
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specific fixed effects capture factors such as demography, culture and natural
endowments. The year-specific fixed effects capture year-specific factors such as
common shocks of industrial unrest, and amendments in the workfare programme
etc. The coefficient of interests (b1) and (b2) estimate the average effect of EPL and
enforcement intensity on state-industry level outcomes (Yi,s,t). As mentioned in the
previous section, the measure on EPL is computed as a cumulative sum of state-
level amendments to the IDA. Enforcement intensity is measured in terms of total
number of labour inspectors for one thousand workers for each state over years. In
addition, the study also adds another coefficient of interest (b3) to the baseline
specification that estimates the interactive effect of EPL and enforcement on the
share of contract workers. (ds,t) is the time varying and state-specific vector of
control variables. (es,t) represents the idiosyncratic error term. Our specification
clusters standard errors at the level of state to deal with concerns of serial corre-
lation (Bertrand et al. 2004).
At a disaggregate level, we estimate-how firms’ demand for temporary contract
workers varies across states with different labour regulation as well as with different
levels of enforcement intensities by adding interaction dummies.
Yi;s;t ¼ aiþasþatþb1 EPLs;t






In Eq. (2), the index on EPL is classified as either pro-worker (?1), pro-employer
(-1) and neutral (0), depending on the cumulative score of IDA for each state.
Enforcement intensity is classified as high (?1) and low (-1) enforcement intensity,
depending on the mean number of labour inspectors across states. Hence, (b3) and
(b4) measure the differential effects of inflexible EPL (pro-workers regime) with
high enforcement, and flexible EPL (pro-employers regime) with low enforcement
on two dependent variables respectively. Sample states with neutral EPL (with ‘0’
code) and average enforcement intensity (with ‘0.23’ mean) are being treated as an
omitted category. When faced with high firing costs, firms located in inflexible
states would have strong incentives to hire more temporary workers than those firms
already located in flexible states. Thus, we expect the magnitude of coefficient (b3)
to be positive and larger than (b4) i.e. ((b3) C (b4)).
Firms’ decision to use capital intensive technology or labour intensive mode of
production are also influenced by the labour regulation climate. Most of the
industries in India are labour intensive hence, the negative of strict EPL is likely to
affect the workforce composition of the firm. In this respect, the study test in
specification (3) whether labour intensive firms recruit contract workers differently
across states with flexible and inflexible labour regimes.
Yi;s;t¼aiþasþatþb1 EPLs;t
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To estimate the impact, the study adds additional variable—labour-intensity dummy
that takes the value ‘1’ if the industry belongs to the category labour-intensive
industry and zero otherwise to (b3) and (b4) respectively.
5.1 Summary statistics
Before, we proceed to formal analysis, Table 1 present a descriptive statistics of all
relevant variables used in this study. The average size of contract workers in a given
industry-state pair is 1341 with the standard deviation of 7687. The maximum value
of contract workers (i.e. 2,74,266), with the value of the standard deviation, and
their relative difference indicate that the growth of contract workers is heteroge-
neous across the industry-state pair. On the contrary, the relative difference between
the maximum size of regular workers (i.e. 2,45,973) and a standard deviation (i.e.
12,815) indicates that the average number of regular workers is relatively less
dispersed than those of contract workers. Notably, the difference between the
maximum numbers of both types of workers is low. This explains that the variation
in different EPL states causes firms to use either or both type of workers at a
maximum level. There are on an average 105 factories in each industry-state pair.
The mean cumulative score of EPL is (0.31) across all states, which is more close to
the value of EPL index (0.39), constructed by Deakins et al. (2007). The variation in
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Max. Min.
State-industry level outcomes
Contract workers 9586 1341.31 7687.44 274,266 0
Regular workers 9586 4105.05 12815.41 245,973 0
Total workers 9586 7048.15 19,571.75 348,062 0
Value added by contract workers 9586 1250.02 2381.01 151421.4 -578.5
Total factory 9586 105.82 246.29 4301 0
Total output (in ‘000 INR) 9586 51,472.38 195,363.72 4,493,838 -79,257
State level institutions
Employment protection legislation (EPL) 9586 0.31 1.27 4 -2
Enforcement intensity (ENFORCE) 9586 0.23 0.26 0.48 0.05
State-industry level control variables
Value added (in ‘000 INR) 9586 68,433.93 256,603 8,959,593 -12,197
Net State domestic product (per capita in
INR)
9586 252.74 139.94 847 57.86
Development expenditure (per capita in INR) 9586 14,824.82 10,612.96 47,695 224
Electricity consumption (per capita in INR) 9586 1283.00 1870.14 14,761.84 75.06
Road lengths (per capita) 9586 112,334.9 88,606.91 336,982 223
The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all 8 years and
include an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period
2000–2007
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enforcement intensity across states appears to be low due to an overall decline in the
total number of labour inspectors. Other state level variables, such as per capita state
domestic product, per capita road lengths, per capita electricity consumption, and
per capita state development expenditure exhibit remarkable heterogeneity in state
level resource endowments and development indicators.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Effects on the incidence of contract workers by EPL strictness
and enforcement intensity
It is evident from the previous sections that firms’ decision to hire contract workers
is highly influenced by various institutional factors specific to the particular country.
Table 2 Effects of EPL and enforcement intensity on the share of contract workers (Aggregate)














































(industry ? year ? state)









Adj R2 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.20
No. of observations 9586 9367 9586 9367
The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all eight years
and include an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period
2000–2007. We report robust standard error in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states
* Significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %
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In the context of India, this paper identifies variations in EPL and enforcement
intensity in Indian states over several years as a major source of heterogeneous
growth in the proportion of contract workers in the manufacturing sector. We began
by testing our premise: whether firms located in stricter EPL states hire
differentially more temporary contract workers in response to variable enforcement
intensity. Table 2 presents the estimated results for Eq. (1)—whether strict EPL and
high enforcement intensity induce demand for contract workers at the aggregate
level. Col. (1) of Table 2, shows that the overall impact of EPL and enforcement
intensity are positive and significantly associated with the share of contract workers.
The average estimated effect is larger for the coefficient on enforcement intensity
than EPL.
Next, we control for differential industry-state-year specific effects. The
inclusion of these effects allows us to control for unobserved, time-varying,
industry-state shocks that are potentially correlated with our variables of interest
(thus exploiting changes within states over time). In addition to fixed effects, we
control for state specific covariates to analyse robustness of our baseline
specification. Inclusion of these control variables allows us to identify the effects
of labour regulation, and enforcement that vary along the some dimension. It further
mitigates concerns that economic development and growth are endogenous to
industrial development, while controlling for these potentially important determi-
nants of industrial performance (Aghion et al. 2008). Col (2) reports that the
magnitude of coefficients becomes larger for both independent variables after
controlling for fixed effects and state level covariates. The results indicate that
strongly enforced legal rights for regular workers actually increase the demand for
contract workers than strict EPL. Both the estimated coefficients are positive and
significant but the magnitude of enforcement intensity is higher than EPL. High
enforcement intensity that actually increases the overall compliance costs with
labour regulation is likely to increase the demand for contract workers. The point
estimate suggests that one unit increase in enforcement intensity leads to 1.05 %
point basis increase in the proportion of contract workers within an industry. Results
obtained from Col. (1) and (2) shows that firms located in strict EPL and high
enforcement regime are likely to hire more contract workers. However, a firm
perceives a higher level of enforcement intensity as a stronger factor that influences
their choice for contract workers than strict EPL.
The effectiveness of flexible or inflexible labour laws depends on how well they
are being enforced in a particular context. As mentioned in the introduction, labour
markets in developed countries perfectly complied, but this is not true for the labour
markets of developing countries. Although India appears to be strict in terms of EPL
on paper, but in practice the legislations are poorly enforced (Nagaraj 2004).
Next, the study tests the joint impact of EPL and enforcement intensity on the
share of contract workers. In col. (3) and (4), we re-estimate the baseline
specification by adding an interactive term i.e. (EPL*ENFORCE), to analyse the
average impact of strict EPL when it is perfectly enforced on the firms’ demand for
contract workers. Using controls and fixed effects, the estimated impact of
interaction term is large, positive and significantly different than zero for contract
workers. The point estimate indicates that a unit increase in strictness of both EPL
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and Enforcement are likely to wield a positive impact on contract workers in state-
industry pair by 0.31 % point. This implies that both firing costs as well as
compliance costs (i.e. through effective enforcement), as mandated through strict
EPL, act as pivotal factors in the employment decision. Thus, when faced with strict
legal regimes, firms would probably circumvent those laws by reducing the demand
for regular workers and increase the demand for temporary contract workers since
the latter category of workers are exempted from legal compliance.
Table 3 Effects on the share of contract workers by variable EPL and enforcement intensities
(Disaggregated)












































(industry ? year ? state)
No Yes Yes








Adj R2 0.16 0.20 0.22
No. of observations 9586 9367 9586
The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all eight years
and include an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period
2000–2007. We report robust standard errors in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of state
* Significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %
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6.2 Effects on the incidence of contract workers by variable EPL strictness
and enforcement intensity
In this section, we discuss the results on the differential response of firms towards
contract workers that varies across states with different labour regulation as well as
with diverse level of enforcement intensities as formulated in the Eq. (2). We expect
that due to a restrictive legal environment, firms located in inflexible states would
have strong incentive to hire more temporary workers than those firms who are
already located in a flexible environment. Thus, the estimated effects would be
larger in inflexible states as compared to flexible states. Col. (1) and (2) Table 3
reports that the differential response to contract workers is higher in strict EPL
regime with high enforcement intensity; the response is quite low in states with low
EPL and low enforcement intensity. In the same column, the coefficients on EPL
and enforcement intensity reports the analogous results as presented in the previous
section. In col. (3), we controlled for fixed effects and included additional control
variables to check the robustness of results obtained from col. (1) and (2). The re-
estimated results are fully consistent with those obtained above. States that have
strict EPL with high enforcement intensity are likely to witness an increasing
number of contract workers than those states that have had a flexible labour
regulation regime. The results obtained from the Table 2 also provide a strong case
for differential response of contract workers, through rejecting the hypothesis that
the response to contract workers is equal across EPL and enforcement regimes. The
point estimate suggests that highly inflexible states, with strict enforcement
intensities, experience 0.23 % point higher incidence of contract workers relative to
flexible states with lenient enforcement. This result is indicated in the Fig. (4) that
captures the macro level trend.
6.3 Effects on the incidence of contract workers across labour intensive
industries by variable EPL strictness and enforcement intensity
In India, almost all industries rely on labour intensive technology. The selection of
technology for the production activities is susceptible to the local regulatory
environment. In the previous two sections, it was seen that the variation in strictness
in EPL and enforcement intensities across states leads to differential responses to
the demand for contract workers. In this section, we exploit the response of these
variations in flexible, inflexible and neutral labour regimes and test whether they
vary across the labour intensive industries. We estimate the regression Eq. (3),
analogous to our previous Eqs. (1) and (2). In this specification, we interact with the
dummy variable for labour intensive industries with our main independent variables.
Col. (1)–(3) in Table 4 reports the average effect of the interaction term that allows
us to examine the differential effects for labour intensive industries across states.
Controlling for macro trends and fixed effects, the average effect on the incidence of
contract workers, in labour intensive industries, by variable EPL, and enforcement
intensities, in the inflexible states, is somewhat higher compared to the flexible
states. The null hypothesis: the response to temporary contract workers in labour
intensive industries is equal across different EPL and enforcement regimes. The
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point estimates indicate that firms located in pro-worker labour states with a high
enforcement intensity demand 0.13 % point basis more contract workers than firms
located in pro-employer states with low enforcement intensity.
6.4 Endogeneity concerns
Throughout this paper, we have considered the effect of EPL and enforcement
intensity on the share of contract workers, but it cannot be denied that these effects
could be driven by a reverse causality. A change in labour regulations does not
Table 4 Effects on the share of contract workers across labour intensive industries by variable EPL and
enforcement intensities (Disaggregated)












































(industry ? year ? state)
No Yes Yes








Adj R2 0.16 0.19 0.21
No. of observations 9586 9586 9586
The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all eight years
and include an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period
2000–2007. We report robust standard errors in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states
* Significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %
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occur randomly. In this case, it is also possible that changes in labour regulation
may result from an inconsistency in economic and political outcomes that would
influence the costs and benefits of passing individual amendments to the IDA. In
such a case, our estimates of these effects would be too high. Using exogenous
sources of variations in the IDA, and instrumenting labour regulation measures
would help address this concern.
Besley and Burgess (2004) found that most changes in labour regulation took
place after 1977, following the declaration of a state of Emergency. This caused a
shock to the incumbent sovereign status in the subsequent elections. The Congress
party lost political power in sixteen out of the thirty-one sample states. The newly
formed non-Congress governments in these states introduced new ideas for the
development of industrial relations. Thus, early changes in the IDA can be
associated with this political shock. Besley and Burgess (2004) suggest two
measures for capturing the initial conditions that trigger political development in
each state and their influence on labour regulation for the period post 1977 when
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State effects No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes




Prob[F 0.0198 0.0089 0.005
Adj R2 0.47 0.49 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.08
Observations 248 9586 9367 9367 9367 248 9586
The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all 8 years and
include an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period
2000–2007. We report robust standard errors in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states
* Significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %
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political competition intensified: (1) the pre-1977 unionisation, and (2) the historical
pattern of land tenure captured by the proportion of district in each state, which had
non-landlord-based revenue collection systems. These two variables explain
significant transitions in the industrial relations due to changes in political power
from the Congress party to non-Congress regional parties. Those states where
regional parties have a majority witnessed a more protective attitude towards labour
regulation and welfare, than the Congress-ruled states. We explore two variables as
our instruments for regulation measures restricted to amendments that took place
after 1977. Col. (1) of Table 5 indicates the ordinary least square estimate of labour
regulation measures from two instrumental variables for a sample of thirty-one
states. Both instruments are strongly correlated with labour regulation (F-
statistics = 5.15). The union variable is positively correlated with labour regulation,
while the variable based on the proportion of districts with non-landlord based
revenue collection systems is negatively correlated with labour regulation. In cols.
(3) to (5) we report instrumental variable estimates of the effects of instrumented
labour regulation on the proportion of contract workers. The results are robust to our
instrument variables.5 It also implies that the effects of instrumenting labour
regulation, on the growth of contract workers in Indian industries, indeed has a
slightly larger impact than those reported by the OLS. The standard errors for the IV
estimates are also larger than the OLS standard errors.
During the Emergency, a major transition in political control of states was
accompanied by the revival of judicial activism in India. Raparelia (2013) observes
that the Supreme Court of India, in the late 1970s, emerged as a resuscitate judicial
authority, and protected the Court’s independence following its capitulation during
the Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency (1975–1977). The study argues that the
emergence of judicial activism in India was largely influenced by the swelling of
diverse social movements that emerged in the mid—1970s. During the period,
Indian courts began to deliver various socio-economic entitlements in the
Constitution, justiciable through its substantive re-interpretations, and implicitly
strengthening enforcement mechanisms (Chatterjee 1998). Higher judicial activism
had a spill-over effect on labour jurisprudence and industrial relations (Raparelia
2013). The study assumes that changes in the political climate during Emergency
would have influenced the enforcement of pro-worker labour regulation (inflexible).
Two instruments were used to see whether variation in the enforcement intensities is
primarily due to changes in the Court’s stance, and not from the industrial
development to enforcement of labour regulation. In col. (6), the OLS estimates of
two instrumental variables on the enforcement index is positive and significant (F-
statistics = 7.56). This implies that the wave of changes in political climate was
also associated with changes in the enforcement of labour regulation. Our
instrumental variable estimate of the effects of instrumented enforcement intensity
on contract workers is positive and significant. This indicates that the changes in the
attitude of enforcement authorities towards labour regulation would have been
5 The F-statistics in the first stage regression is 7.26 (this is a state-year regression with standard error
cluster at the state level), indicating that the instruments have some power in explaining the direction of
labour regulation.
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influenced by the changes brought by the Emergency. This attitude, which still
persists, can be seen in the manner in which the enforcement authorities
differentially enforce labour laws.
As a robustness checks, this study presents two estimates of alternative
specification in order to check the sensitivity of our findings. First, we replace
our measures on EPL and enforcement intensity with alternative indexes proposed
by Goswami et al. (2002), and Montag (2013)6 and Fagerna¨s (2010).7 The re-
estimated result in Table 6 confirms that the effects of EPL and enforcement
intensity are positive and significant on the growth of contract workers in the Indian
manufacturing sector. Second, In Table 7, we present another robustness check
using the generalised method of moments (GMM) technique (see Arnellano and
Bond 1991). We specify valid instruments in each time period for the first difference
equation. Col (1) in Table 7 controls for year and industry fixed effects by including
dummy variables, controls for states fixed effects by first differencing the data, and
then controls for the panel bias instrumenting the differenced lagged dependent
variable with lagged level of dependent variables dated t-2 and earlier. The
coefficient on EPL and ENFORCE is still positive and significant. Next in col. (2)
we include the more general specification of lags of the dependent and independent
variables. The estimated effect of both EPL and ENFORCE is still positive and
comfortably significant.
7 Conclusion
This paper estimate the joint effect of EPL and enforcement intensity on the
incidence of temporary contract workers, by exploiting variation across space and
time in the extent of EPL and enforcement intensity, in the Indian context. In
particular, we examine whether firms located in a stricter EPL regime hire
differentially a greater number of temporary contract workers in response to
variable enforcement intensity. Our results indicate that the average effect of strict
EPL and enforcement intensity on the incidence of temporary contract workers is
positive and statistically significant across Indian states. This result corroborates
with the theoretical prediction and argues that the overall strict EPL that protects the
rights of regular workers and ensures their strong enforcement causes firms to hire
more temporary contract workers relative to regular workers. We report that firms in
inflexible labour regimes and those in flexible labour regimes hire differentially
more temporary contract workers in response to variable enforcement intensities.
Finally, we find that labour intensive industries located in inflexible states, witness
6 The index on labour regulation constructed by Goswami et al. (2002) is based on a survey of
entrepreneurs and managers in 11,000 manufacturing companies in India. Montag (2013) uses both
indices proposed by Besley and Burgess (2004) and Goswami et al. (2002) to construct a combined index
of labour regulation. The index takes a value of 1 if both indices do not show any changes, and -1 if
either index contradicts the other.
7 Based on state level amendments to the IDA, Fagerna¨s (2010) constructs a proxy index on
‘‘enforcement act’’ that would allow for individual workers or employers to apply directly to the Labour
Court for adjudication, or an amendment that raises the punishment for non-implementation of the award.
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Table 6 Robustness check-I














Adj R2 0.12 0.16
Observations 9586 9586
The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all 8 years and
include an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period
2000–2007. We report robust standard errors in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states
* Significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %
Table 7 Robustness check-II
Log contract workers Log contract workers
1 2













(industry ? year ? state)
Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.18 0.20
Observations 8161 8161
The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all 8 years and
include an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period
2000-2007. We report robust standard errors in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states
* Significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %
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higher incidence of contract workers than those located in flexible states. Therefore,
we conjecture that firms hire differentially more temporary contract workers in
response to variable enforcement intensity to circumvent firing and overall
mandated compliance costs and it further gives them more flexibility in adjusting
the workforce.
This paper adds to the growing perception that-the difference between labour
regulation and its actual enforcement, in developing countries, has not generated
enough incentives for compliance with labour regulation. And therefore, firms
prefer to use a greater number of contract workers to reduce labour costs thus
enabling them to adapt to fluctuations in the product market competition.
This paper does not claim that the strict EPL and enforcement intensities are the
only factors responsible for the rise of contract workers in the Indian economy.
There are other factors such as state specific business environment, nature of the
capital market, and foreign direct investment that could be responsible for shaping
the industrial climate in India. Due to the lack of data at the state level we were not
able to include these factors but we hope that these issues can be addressed through
future research.
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Appendix 1
An Overview of Index on Employment Protection Legislation and Enforcement
Intensity across Indian states
States EPL ENFORCE
Andaman and Nicobar (UT) 0 0.13
Andhra Pradesh -2 0.22
Assam 1 0.09
Bihar 1 0.20
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States EPL ENFORCE
Chandigarh (UT) 1 0.16
Chattisgarh 1 0.21
Dadara Nagar Haveli (UT) 0 0.09
Daman and Diu (UT) 0 0.11




Himachal Pradesh 1 0.21










Pondicherry (UT) 0 0.06
Punjab 1 0.22
Rajasthan -1 0.27
Tamil Nadu -2 0.30
Tripura 0 0.15
Uttar Pradesh -1 0.37
Uttaranchal 0 0.21
West Bengal 4 0.44
Source: Author’s own calculation (see Sect. 4 for the data description)
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